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Abstract
Which kinds of responsibility can we attribute to which kinds of collective, and why? In contrast, which kinds of collective 
responsibility can we not attribute—which kinds are ‘gappy’? This study provides a framework for answering these questions. 
It begins by distinguishing between three kinds of collective (diffuse, teleological, and agential) and three kinds of respon-
sibility (causal, moral, and prospective). It then explains how gaps—i.e. cases where we cannot attribute the responsibility 
we might want to—appear to arise within each type of collective responsibility. It argues some of these gaps do not exist on 
closer inspection, at least for some collectives and some of the time.
Keywords Collective responsibility · Collective agency · Responsibility gaps · Causation · Blame · Duty
Introduction
Collective responsibility is full of holes. By this, I do not 
mean that collective responsibility is incoherent or non-
existent. I mean there are many situations in which we 
are unable to attribute all the responsibility we might pre-
reflectively want to attribute to collectives, such as business 
corporations and states. The diversity of collective responsi-
bility gaps, and the connections and disconnections between 
them, has not yet been fully appreciated. My aim is to exam-
ine the breadth of gaps and the challenges they pose for 
asserting that collectives have responsibility.
A failure to distinguish between types of collective 
responsibility gaps can lead to confusion. Thus, my main 
message is a call for clarity when we discuss collective 
responsibility gaps. Secondarily, I will argue that some types 
of collective responsibility gap do not exist at all, while oth-
ers are quite common. This study also has a third message: 
that a failure to distinguish different types of collective 
responsibility gaps might make us more sceptical of col-
lective responsibility than we ought to be. That is, when we 
notice the existence of one type of collective responsibility 
gap, we might infer that other types of collective responsibil-
ity gap also exist. That inference would be a mistake.
To catalogue collective responsibility gaps, we must 
first understand the breadth of phenomena captured by the 
phrase ‘collective responsibility.’ To this end, the first sec-
tion typologises three kinds of collective and three kinds of 
responsibility. I then motivate the idea each kind of respon-
sibility faces gaps in collective contexts, with reference to 
the Great Pacific Garbage Patch (GPGP). To remedy this 
dire prognosis, I argue that some collective responsibility 
gaps can be filled—and some can be filled for some kinds of 
collective, but not others. The result is that there are many 
kinds of collective responsibility of gaps, but not as many 
as meets the eye.
Types of Collective, Types of Responsibility
In philosophy, legal theory, and political theory, it has long 
been acknowledged that ‘responsibility’ is multiply ambigu-
ous (Hart 1968; Feinberg 1970, pp. 130–139; Scanlon 1998, 
pp. 290–294; Miller 2007, pp. 81–91). More recently in phi-
losophy, it has also been acknowledged that ‘collective’ is 
multiply ambiguous (Isaacs 2011, pp. 24–27). To illustrate, 
consider the following three responsibility attributions:
A. ‘19th century industrialists affected global warming.’
B. ‘The fossil fuel lobby is to blame for global warming.’
C. ‘BP has an obligation to clean up its oil spill.’ * Stephanie Collins 
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Each refers to a different collective type and responsibil-
ity type.
Statement A concerns a diffuse collective and causal 
responsibility. Diffuse collectives are groups of agents who 
are not united either by acting responsively to one another 
as they work towards a common goal, or by acting under a 
collective-level decision-making procedure. These include 
‘humanity,’ ‘affluent consumers,’ ‘tech companies,’ and 
‘developed states.’ The agents in a diffuse collective can 
be utterly random (e.g. ‘me, BP, and Botswana’), though 
more commonly we’ll be concerned with agents that have a 
socially significant property in common. In this study, I am 
concerned with diffuse collectives whose members include 
agential collectives (defined shortly). Regarding responsibil-
ity, Statement A attributes causal responsibility—impact or 
influence without, necessarily, praiseworthiness or blame-
worthiness. Causal responsibility need not involve actions: 
a storm can be causally responsible for a fallen power line.
Statement B concerns a teleological collective and moral 
responsibility. The collective is teleological in that its mem-
bers (1) act responsively to one another (insofar as they 
encounter one another) as they work toward a common goal 
(oil-friendly public policy), but (2) lack clear procedures for 
forming decisions, intentions, beliefs, and desires that are 
attributable to the collective as such. When we say ‘the fossil 
fuel lobby wants or believes X,’ we do not mean that this is 
an official corporate position of some particular entity that 
can outlive whoever happens to currently make up the fossil 
fuel lobby. Instead, we simply mean that all or most fossil 
fuel lobbyists currently want or believe X.1
Nonetheless, members of teleological collectives are 
interlinked: when I say they are disposed to be ‘mutually 
responsive,’ I mean they are disposed to reinforce, predict, 
and rely upon each other’s pursuit of the goal that they share. 
We can analyse this further in different ways. For example, 
the lobbyists are an example of Bratman’s (1992, p. 328) 
‘shared cooperative activity,’ in which ‘each participating 
agent [knows] that the other is attempting to be similarly 
responsive’; Kutz’s (2000) acting together through ‘partici-
patory intentions’ to do one’s part in an action or project 
together with others; and Tuomela’s (2006, p. 38) joint inten-
tional action, which ‘amounts to the group members’ jointly 
intending X and jointly acting on the basis of their joint 
intention.’ Each of these specifications is more demanding 
than the minimal notion I will work with [defined by char-
acteristics (1) and (2) above].
With regards to the responsibility evoked in Statement 
B, the lobbyists’ responsibility concerns something that 
they were causally responsible for and are liable to praise 
or blame for. This makes the responsibility moral. By ‘is 
liable to praise or blame,’ I mean ‘deserves or merits praise/
blame,’ or ‘is a fitting object of praise/blame’. The liability 
here is backwards-looking and reactive: it responds to what 
the entity has done in the past, not to what they might do in 
the future (Strawson 1960).
Finally, Statement C concerns an agential collective and 
prospective responsibility. BP has a well-defined collective-
level decision-making procedure, the use of which enables 
us to attribute some decisions (and intentions, beliefs, and 
desires) to BP as such. An agential collective has a group-level 
decision-making procedure—a process that takes in reasons 
and produces aims and instructions—that is operationally 
distinct from the procedures held respectively by its mem-
bers. It is operationally distinct in that its reasons and beliefs 
(inputs) may not be identical to the reasons and beliefs of any 
members; its method for processing inputs (e.g. majoritarian, 
committee-based, or dictatorship rules) is different from the 
method of any one member when deciding for herself; and the 
decisions it produces are not the straightforward conjunction 
of individuals’ decisions (List and Pettit 2011). By creating 
its own bundle of decisions, intentions, beliefs, desires, and so 
on, the agential collective comes to have what Rovane (1998) 
calls a ‘rational point of view.’ That is, the organisation acts 
from a particular web of judgments, goals, and intentions, 
and it updates these in order to maintain both the internal 
coherence of the web and to achieve the goals via the inten-
tions in accordance with the judgments. This characterisation 
of agential collectives is neutral between more specific sets 
of conditions for when a collective has agency (e.g. Gilbert 
1989; Pettit and Schweikard 2006, p. 33; Preda 2012).
That a collective is teleological does not entail that it is 
agential: a mob is teleological, but not agential. Likewise, a 
collective can be agential without its members having any 
goal in common: consider a criminal organisation with a 
‘cell’ structure, which unites members under a procedure 
while preventing them from having goals in common (List 
and Pettit 2011, p. 33). That said, many agential collectives 
have members that are united around a goal. For example, 
most members of the agential collective ‘BP’ act respon-
sively to one another in pursuit of the goal ‘selling fuel.’
Regarding responsibility, Statement C is about what BP 
has a duty or obligation to do in the future. This makes the 
responsibility prospective. This is the sense of responsi-
bility evoked in debates about corporate social and moral 
responsibility.2 Broadly, we can understand a prospective 
1 In List’s (2014) terms, we attribute an ‘aggregate attitude’ (if the 
attitude is held by most lobbyists or by the average lobbyist), or per-
haps a ‘common attitude’ (if the attitude is unanimous and is out in 
the open amongst the lobbying organisations)—but not a ‘corporate 
attitude.’
2 The distinction between these is of course disputed. Tradition-
ally, corporate social responsibility is about what a business owes to 
society at large, while corporate moral responsibility is about what a 
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responsibility as a moral reason that is presumptively deci-
sive in decision-making. That is, if one has a prospective 
responsibility to do X, then (on pain of blameworthiness) 
one should presume, in one’s practical reasoning, that one 
ought to do X, all-moral-things-considered, unless and until 
one is presented with strong countervailing moral reasons.
The distinction between the three kinds of responsibility 
is outlined in Table 1. Moral and causal responsibility attri-
butions are similar in that they are both backwards-looking: 
they both concern what happened in the past. But moral 
responsibility assertions imply moral judgments about those 
happenings, while causal responsibility assertions do not. 
Their common backward-looking nature can be contrasted 
with prospective responsibility attributions’ forward-looking 
nature. Yet, like moral responsibility, prospective respon-
sibility assertions imply moral judgments. I hope the three 
example sentences above demonstrate that ‘responsibility’ 
can be used in all three senses (see also those cited above 
on the ambiguity of responsibility). This way of carving up 
the distinctions brings to light a fourth category: non-moral 
responsibility attributions that are concerned with future 
events. Thus we might say: “The upcoming cyclone will be 
responsible for wild weather.” Such predictions are not so 
much a concern of business ethics, so I leave them aside in 
this study.
The two tripartite distinctions (between three kinds of 
collectives and three kinds of responsibility) yield a frame-
work for investigating gaps in collective responsibility. 
Prima facie, each kind of responsibility is attributable to 
each kind of collective. This gives rise to nine types of col-
lective responsibility (Table 2). Statements A, B, and C 
occupy the top-left, centre, and bottom-right cells. Notice 
that, in each case, to attribute responsibility to a collective 
is to attribute it to the collective as such. That is, when we 
say that industrialists, the fossil fuels lobby, or BP has col-
lective responsibility for some affair, we are not just saying 
that many or most or all individual members have respon-
sibility for it. Instead, we are saying the collective itself has 
responsibility. Just what this means—for each collective and 
each kind of responsibility—will become clearer as the dis-
cussion proceeds.
These categories are often obscured by language and 
reality. As the language in the table demonstrates, different 
terminology can be used to evoke each of the three kinds of 
responsibility, which can lead to confusion. Also, real con-
nections between the categories obscure their differences. 
For example, take moral and prospective responsibility. If 
one faces moral responsibility, then, we usually assume, one 
has reneged on a (past) prospective responsibility3; if one 
has a prospective responsibility, then one faces the prospect 
of moral responsibility if one reneges on that prospective 
responsibility. These connections might tempt us to equate 
moral and prospective responsibility. That would be a mis-
take, since there are also disconnections: one can have a pro-
spective responsibility for repairing a harm while not having 
moral responsibility for the existence of that harm, and one 
Table 1  Types of responsibility
Is concerned with past events Is concerned with future events
Implies moral judgment Moral responsibility attribution Prospective responsibility attribution
Implies no moral judgement Causal responsibility attribution Predictive causation attribution[not a 
concern of this paper]
Table 2  Types of collective responsibility
Responsibility
Causal responsibility Moral responsibility Prospective responsibility
Collective Diffuse collective e.g. ‘19th century industrialists 
affected global warming.’
e.g. ‘Present-day motor compa-
nies are culpable for causing 
global warming.’
e.g. ‘Present-day motor companies 
have a duty to ameliorate global 
warming.’
Teleological collective e.g. ‘The fossil fuels lobby causes 
lax government policy.’
e.g. ‘The fossil fuels lobby is to 
blame for global warming.’
e.g. ‘The fossil fuels lobby would 
do the right thing by ceasing to 
exist.’
Agential collective e.g. ‘BP had a role in the Deep 
Horizon oil spill.’
e.g. ‘BP is to be praised for its 
efforts.’
e.g. ‘BP has an obligation to clean 
up its oil spill.’
3 I will question this in “Teleological Collectives” section.
business owes to a narrower set of entities, such as shareholders and 
key stakeholders (Werhane 2008, pp. 270–271). Alternatively, some-
times corporate social responsibility is viewed as optional or morally 
supererogatory, while corporate moral responsibility is mandatory or 
morally required (Waddock 2004). Yet both concepts concern what 





can have moral responsibility for the existence of the harm 
while not having prospective responsibility for repairing it 
(for example, if one is unable to repair it).
Responsibility Gaps
An Example
What does it mean for there to be gaps in collective respon-
sibility? In short, it means that we have a pre-theoretic intui-
tion, or (equivalently) a pre-reflective gut reaction, that a 
particular collective (whether diffuse, teleological, or agen-
tial) bears a particular kind of responsibility (causal, moral, 
or prospective), yet we cannot justify or vindicate that pre-
theoretic intuition upon engaging in principled reflection. 
To be clear, in the cases I have in mind, our intuition or 
gut reaction is not that “someone or other must be respon-
sible.” If that were the intuition, then we would need to 
specify exactly which collective we are talking about, before 
we could know that the intuition is not justifiable (this is 
because the justifiability of the intuition, as we shall see, 
often hinges on what kind of collective it is). Instead, a col-
lective responsibility gap arises when we have an intuition 
that some specific collective (of one of the three types) is 
responsible—but it turns out that it cannot be.
To illustrate, consider the Great Pacific Garbage Patch 
(GPGP). This is a vast area in the North Pacific Ocean—per-
haps twice the size of the continental United States (Marks 
and Howden 2008)—which is, in effect, an “unstrained 
consommé of small bits of floating plastic” (Kaiser 2010, 
p. 150). The bits of plastic that make up the GPGP are 
in various stages of disintegration. Many are invisible to 
the human eye, while others are identifiable as bags, toys, 
cups, and so on. Most will never fully break down into their 
molecular parts (NOAA 2017). The precise effects of the 
GPGP on sea life are uncertain, but various creatures are 
disposed to ingest the plastic, which in the meantime will 
have adsorbed toxic chemicals. The plastics and associated 
chemicals will then enter the food chain (Teuten et al. 2009).
The GPGP is an intriguing case for collective responsibil-
ity, because it is many miles from any country’s coastline 
and thus no state has jurisdiction over it. Various agential 
collectives have, however, acknowledged its existence. For 
example, in 2013, UNESCO and the Italian Ministry of the 
Environment sponsored a performance art installation aimed 
at raising awareness of the GPGP (UNESCO 2013). And 
the Algalita Marine Research Foundation has voluntarily 
engaged in privately funded research into the GPGP’s extent 
and effects.4 But notably lacking is any broader taking of, 
or attribution of, collective responsibility (whether causal, 
moral, and prospective)—for example, responsibility placed 
on states, which regulate plastics production and consump-
tion, or on corporations, which both produce and consume 
plastic products. The United States’ National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has described the 
prospect of cleaning up the debris as a “tremendous chal-
lenge” (NOAA 2017). Far from attributing prospective 
responsibility to collectives such as states or businesses, 
NOAA’s and UNESCO’s only suggestions for cleaning 
up the GPGP target individual action (in short, admonish-
ing individuals to ‘reduce, reuse, recycle’) (NOAA 2017; 
UNESCO 2013).5
One plausible reason for this lack of collective responsi-
bility-attribution is that the GPGP appears to exhibit several 
types of collective responsibility gap. The rest of this section 




A causal responsibility gap arises just in case our pre-theo-
retical intuition is that some particular entity caused some 
effect, but, upon reflection, it did not. Causal explanations 
matter for our historical understanding of the world, includ-
ing how it produces outcomes that harm us. Such expla-
nations are not the primary concern of ethicists. However, 
victims who are harmed by outcomes are often concerned to 
know simply how something happened, without necessarily 
knowing who is to blame or who has a duty to ameliorate the 
outcome. Thus, causal responsibility does matter ethically, 
insofar responding to victim’s concerns matters ethically. 
Let’s assume the GPGP is a bad effect. Who—or what—
caused it? There are two reasons why any intuitive answer 
to that question might seem indefensible, creating a gap in 
causal responsibility.
The first is empirical complexity. While some of the 
ocean’s plastic comes from ships, most of it comes from 
land. Ultimately, it can come from production and consump-
tion that occurs far inland. These causal chains are near-
impossible to track. To attribute any part of the GPGP—or, 
4 http://www.algal ita.org.
5 The GPGP is not the only case of this kind. Another glaring exam-
ple is global warming. Again, it’s a harmful outcome, not under any 
one state’s jurisdiction, and for which no collective is being seriously 
attributed, or is taking, responsibility. I focus on the GPGP case sim-
ply because the causal, moral, and prospective processes involved are 
somewhat simpler. Thus, it is more straightforward for demonstrating 
the theoretical points. But my argument would, with more complex 
empirical analysis, almost certainly extend to global warming.
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more ambitiously, the whole GPGP—to any specific entity 
is utterly empirically infeasible. Most simply, this is because 
much of the GPGP is micro-plastics—pieces of plastic 
between 0.3 and 5 mm in diameter (National Geographic 
2014). They often cannot be distinguished one from the 
other, and so we cannot know whether any particular micro-
plastic was eroded off this Coca-Cola bottle rather than that 
Coca-Cola bottle. And even if a piece of plastic is identifi-
able as, say, a bottle, it’s unimaginable that we would be able 
to pick it up in the GPGP and trace it to a particular shopper, 
or even a particular shop or factory.
The second reason for apparent causal responsibility gaps 
is the conceptual ambiguity of causation. Let’s suppose (per 
impossible) that we know a particular piece of plastic was 
once part of a particular Coca-Cola bottle, bought by a par-
ticular person in a particular shop on a particular day. Who 
caused the bottle’s parts to end up in the GPGP? There are 
numerous possibilities: Coca-Cola, who designed and mar-
keted the bottle; the consumer, who purchased the bottle; 
the local government, who didn’t install trash cans at the 
beach where the consumer discarded the bottle; and so on. 
We might try to say that each of these agents—and more 
besides—caused it. However, each can argue that, if they 
hadn’t done what they did, the bottle might still have ended 
up in the GPGP. Coca-Cola can say that someone else would 
have used bottles from that factory, the local government can 
say that many people ignore trash cans, and the consumer 
can point out that plastic in trash cans still makes it to the 
sea. So in what sense did each of them cause it?
To explain further, suppose you have the pre-theoretical 
intuition that Coca-Cola caused it. We can problematise this 
intuition using two popular theories from the metaphysics of 
causation: the ‘probability’ theory and the ‘process’ theory. 
Under the probability theory, to cause something is to make 
that thing more likely (Schaffer 2016). But had Coca-Cola 
(say) not developed its products whose bottles ended up in 
the GPGP, then Pepsi (or some other company) would have 
had its bottles end up in the bit of the GPGP that Coca-Cola’s 
products in fact ended up in. So Coca-Cola did not raise the 
probability of (that bit of) the GPGP; if Coca-Cola’s bottle 
hadn’t got there, Pepsi’s would have. Coca-Cola merely ‘pre-
empted’ Pepsi’s causal influence. That is, the GPGP (and 
even each individual part of the GPGP) is over-determined: 
subtracting the actions of one entity does not reduce the 
probability of (any part of) the GPGP existing.
Under the ‘process’ theory, to cause something is to phys-
ically produce that thing. This theory also seems to give us 
causal responsibility gaps. Suppose Greenpeace sets out to 
clean up the GPGP, but is prevented from doing so because 
its path is blocked by a fishing trawler. Here, the fishing 
trawler prevents a would-be-preventer from preventing the 
GPGP. So, it’s natural to have the pre-theoretical intuition 
that the fishing trawler had some causal role to play in the 
continued existence of the GPGP. But that role is not one of 
physically producing the GPGP. The process view gives us 
the result that the trawler is causally disconnected from the 
GPGP, undermining our intuition. In this case, the process 
view under-produces causation: it doesn’t identify all the 
causations that our intuitions tell us are there. Conversely, 
if we take an extremely wide view of what might count as 
‘physical production,’ then perhaps the trawler does cause 
the GPGP—but, if we take that wide view, then the pro-
cess view over-produces causation: it will likely tell us that 
almost every action on Earth causes the GPGP.6
That is, under both the ‘probability’ and the ‘process’ 
views, we cannot attribute causal responsibility as often as 
we like it too. It seems we cannot attribute causal respon-
sibility for the GPGP as we would (pre-theoretically) like, 
resulting in causal responsibility gaps.
Moral Responsibility Gaps
A moral responsibility gap arises when our pre-theoretical 
intuition is that some particular entity is morally blamewor-
thy or praiseworthy for some effect, but, upon reflection, 
it is not. Moral responsibility gaps are the most prominent 
kind of collective responsibility gap in the philosophical 
literature, being discussed by Jackson (1987), Copp (2007), 
Pettit (2007), Braham and van Hees (2012), and others. I 
will focus on blameworthiness (as opposed to praiseworthi-
ness) gaps. These can arise in two ways: first, when no one 
did anything blameworthy in the lead-up to some harmful 
outcome; second, when the blameworthy entities’ blamewor-
thiness doesn’t ‘add up’ to blame proportionate to the harm.
Young (2011, pp. 126–130) analyses sweatshop labour 
in these ways. One might think each company that produces 
or sells cheap clothing is blameworthy for the drudgery of 
sweatshop work. But Young explains how each company in 
the supply chain of cheap clothing is operating under pres-
sure and seems not to have any—or at least, not much—
blameworthiness for their role. The same might be said 
about the GPGP. Pre-theoretically, one might think that each 
corporation that produces and uses plastic is blameworthy 
for (part of) the GPGP. But each such company is stuck in 
a competition cycle whereby it must produce plastic trash 
to survive. It would be too demanding to say they must stop 
making and selling plastic products. Of course, some com-
panies operate at huge profits—perhaps such companies do 
have moral responsibility for their contributions (if indeed 
they do ‘contribute’; see the previous section). But others 
operate within extremely tight margins. So, many compa-
nies that produce plastic trash are not morally responsible. 
6 These problems with the probability and process views are outlined 
in more detail in Schaffer (2016).
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Or, at least, they’re not morally responsible enough that the 
aggregate of all the companies’ moral responsibility is pro-
portionate to the size of the moral outrage the GPGP evokes.
One might wonder: if indeed no corporation is blamewor-
thy, then why do we have the gut intuition that the corpora-
tions are blameworthy? I suspect the answer is that humans 
have a (perhaps unconscious) desire to see someone attrib-
uted blame for large-scale harmful outcomes.7 In several 
psychological experiments, it has been found that people 
are more likely to believe an outcome was produced inten-
tionally if that outcome was bad, than if that outcome was 
neutral (Knobe 2003; Nadelhoffer 2004). That is, we have an 
urge to posit intentions behind harms. It is a short step from 
positing such intentions, to pinpointing someone’s intentions 
in particular, to blaming that someone. A moral responsibil-
ity gap arises when this ‘someone’ is not actually blamewor-
thy, including because they are not the kind of thing that can 
be blameworthy.
Prospective Responsibility Gaps
There are three kinds of prospective responsibility gap: abil-
ity, justification, and fulfilment gaps.
An ability gap arises when there is some desirable out-
come—a good to be produced or harm to be avoided—and 
the entity (individual or collective) that we (pre-theoreti-
cally) believe has an obligation to produce that outcome 
cannot produce that outcome. Consider the outcome of the 
GPGP being cleaned up. Organisations like NOAA and 
Algalita lack the resources needed to produce this. Yet we 
instinctively want to say they ought to. This is a problem for 
attributing prospective responsibility to these collectives if 
we assume that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’: something cannot have 
a duty to do something it cannot do (Vranas 2007). So, if 
we face an ability gap, then we cannot attribute collective 
prospective responsibility as we would like.
Suppose we lack an ability gap. Still, a justification gap 
might arise. This happens if there is an entity that can pro-
duce the desirable outcome, but there is no compelling jus-
tification for why they are moral required to produce that 
outcome. This means we cannot assign prospective responsi-
bility as we might initially want. For example, imagine a pri-
vate funder—Bill Gates or Warren Buffett—offers sufficient 
monetary resources to eradicate the GPGP. With the money 
on offer, there are many organisations (NOAA, Algalita, 
Greenpeace) able to clean up the GPGP. However, these 
organisations did not cause the GPGP (whatever that means), 
nor are they culpable for it, nor do they benefit from its exist-
ence. Perhaps, they have a duty simply because of their abil-
ity (Caney 2010). But mere ability-to-produce-an-outcome 
can justify prospective responsibilities to produce that out-
come only if the outcome is very morally valuable, relative 
to other outcomes the agent can produce. So ability will not 
fill all justification gaps.
Finally, consider fulfilment gaps in prospective responsi-
bility. These arise when there are entities who can produce 
the desirable outcome, and there are justifications for their 
duties to produce it. However, they renege. There is a gap 
between the demands of the prospective responsibility and 
the reality of the responsibility-bearer’s actions. There is 
a backward-looking component to these gaps: we assess 
the renegers as morally responsible. However, I categorise 
these as prospective responsibility gaps because the ques-
tion arises about whether (and if so, on what grounds) other 
entities have prospective responsibility to ‘take up the slack’ 
for the renegers’ failures (Miller 2011; Karnein 2012; Stem-
plowska 2016).
Which Collectives Face Which Responsibility 
Gaps?
In the previous section, I suggested that each kind of respon-
sibility cannot be attributed as often as we might like. I now 
want to scrutinise that thought: just how prevalent are these 
responsibility gaps? This will require considering each col-
lective-type separately, because some gaps are prevalent for 
some collective-types but not others.
Diffuse Collectives
Above, I explained that it is highly infeasible to assign causal 
responsibility for the GPGP to any individual, business, or 
government agency. This seemed to imply that the GPGP 
has a causal responsibility gap. But there is another pos-
sibility: could a diffuse collective, as a whole, have causal 
responsibility for the GPGP? Consider the collective com-
posed of all plastics-using agents (individuals and agential 
collectives). These agents are not united by acting respon-
sively to one another as they work towards a common goal 
(indeed, their goals are in opposition, insofar as they are 
competitors). Nor are they united under a collective-level 
decision-making procedure. This collective is diffuse. Can 
we attribute causal responsibility to it? It is tempting to think 
not. After all, there is no united entity here for responsibility 
to be attributed to.
The metaphysics of causation can help here. I shall use 
Christian List and Peter Menzie’s difference-making account 
(a version of the probability account) to show that causal 
responsibility can be attributed to diffuse collectives, plug-
ging causal responsibility gaps.
Consider the following. What matters for the existence 
of the GPGP is not that Coca-Cola, Pepsi, Greenpeace, a 7 I thank * for raising this.
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fishing trawler, a local government, and a consumer—
alongside innumerable other agents—each performed cer-
tain highly specific actions. As explained in the previous 
section, the GPGP would still have existed if those actions 
had been different. Those actions are specific instantiations 
of a more generally describable phenomenon: plastics use 
by plastics-users. If we insist that a causal explanation of 
the GPGP cannot refer to this diffuse collective, but must 
instead list all the specific actions of all the specific entities 
included within that diffuse collective, then we would get a 
causal explanation that ‘does not satisfactorily fit the role [of 
‘cause’] because it is overly specific and involves extraneous 
detail.’ (List and Menzies 2009, pp. 479–480). To illustrate, 
List and Menzies give an example from Stephen Yablo:
consider a pigeon that has been trained to peck at all 
and only red objects. The pigeon is presented with a 
red target and she pecks at it. As it happens, the target 
is a specific shade of crimson. What caused the pigeon 
to peck? Was it the fact that the target was red or the 
fact that it was crimson? … The target’s being red is 
of the right degree of specificity to count as a cause of 
the pigeon’s action. In contrast, the target’s being crim-
son is too specific to count as a cause of the pigeon’s 
pecking: citing it as a cause might give the erroneous 
impression that the pigeon would not peck at anything 
non-crimson (List and Menzies 2009, p. 480)
The point is this: the target’s being crimson isn’t what 
makes the pigeon peck. The pigeon would have pecked if 
the target were maroon, or scarlet, and so on. What makes a 
difference to the pecking is that the pigeon’s target is some 
form of red or other.
Likewise for the GPGP. Coca-Cola’s designing bottles 
isn’t what makes a difference to the GPGP existing. Instead, 
what makes a difference is that some-collection-or-other 
of entities, taken as a whole, in aggregate, produce large 
amounts of (what ends up being) plastic trash. The diffuse 
collective ‘plastics-using agents, whoever they happen to be’ 
is the grouping that has the right level of detail to explain 
how the GPGP occurs. The causal power of this diffuse col-
lective is ‘realisation insensitive’ (List and Menzies 2009, 
p. 496; List and Spiekermann 2013). That is, regardless of 
which particular agents happen to be part of this large plas-
tics-using diffuse collective, the GPGP will result; and if 
the large plastics-using diffuse collective did not exist, then 
the GPGP will not result. It is this collective that makes the 
difference.
If we follow List and Menzies in this way, then we can 
say the diffuse collective ‘plastics-users’ causes the GPGP, 
while none of its members does. More generally, we can 
say that diffuse collectives can have causal responsibil-
ity: polluters as a group cause pollution; bargain apparel 
companies as a group cause the continuation of sweatshop 
conditions; and so on. Given that diffuse collectives are 
everywhere and made up of anything, this result has the 
power to eradicate causal responsibility gaps, assuming we 
can pinpoint the right diffuse collective in each case. This 
result also allows us to judge that all statements in the left-
hand column of Table 1 are defensible (at least, pending 
empirical demonstration that the collectives named in that 
column are indeed the collectives with which the relevant 
effect does occur, and without which it does not occur). By 
salvaging our ability to provide collective-level historical 
causal assertions about all three kinds of collective, List 
and Menzies’ account salvages our ability to satisfy vic-
tims who are concerned to have historical knowledge of 
how their situation came about.
So far, so good. But we cannot extend this vindication 
of diffuse collectives’ causal responsibility to their pro-
spective and moral responsibility. The main problem can 
be explained briefly. It is that diffuse collectives lack the 
volitions necessary for prospective and moral responsibil-
ity. To explain, consider that there are numerous outcomes 
that are possible: sweatshop labour could end; global 
warming could be limited to 2 degrees above 1990 levels; 
the GPGP could be cleaned up. But for there to be moral 
or prospective responsibility over those outcomes (or their 
absence), the outcomes (or absence) must be tied in some 
way to volitions (decisions, intentions, willings, tryings). 
For there to be moral responsibility for an outcome, there 
must have been a past volition that did (in some way) 
cause the outcome. For there to be prospective responsibil-
ity for an outcome, there must be the possibility of a future 
volition, produced via moral reasoning, which could (in 
some way) cause the outcome.
Unlike agential collectives, diffuse collectives cannot 
have their own, group-level volitions, decision, intentions, 
willings, or tryings (Lawford-Smith 2015, p. 235)—either 
in the past or in the future. Of course, we could say that 
many or most members of a diffuse collective have indi-
vidual volitions over the same thing. For example, we 
could imagine that many or most plastics users acquire 
an individual volition to eradicate the GPGP. But that 
would be a statistical fact about the individuals; this does 
not take the group as a united whole. And if all mem-
bers of the collective were to have the volition, then that 
would render the collective teleological. (It is innocuous 
to assume that, when individuals have a goal in common, 
they will respond to one another, insofar they encounter 
one another, in their individual pursuits of that goal.) With 





Recall that members of teleological collectives (1) act 
responsively to one another (insofar they encounter one 
another) as they work toward a common goal, but (2) lack 
clear procedures for making decisions that are attributable 
to the collective as such. The arguments above about causal 
responsibility in diffuse groups extend straightforwardly to 
teleological collectives: if diffuse collectives can be caus-
ally responsible, then so can teleological collectives. The 
unity present in teleological collectives (as compared with 
diffuse collectives) makes it more likely that, in a teleologi-
cal collective, the collective level-of-description will be the 
difference-maker for some effect. This includes such collec-
tives as ‘the plastics lobby,’ ‘democracy-endorsing states,’ 
and ‘environmental non-governmental organisations.’
Again like diffuse collectives, teleological collectives are 
poor candidates for prospective responsibilities. While the 
members of teleological collectives do have volitions with 
the same content, these groups lack a group-level decision-
making procedure that could process obligations and itself 
produce a volition, via moral reasoning, to perform the 
action that an obligation requires of the group per se (indeed, 
the group per se cannot act at all, in virtue of not having 
such a decision-making procedure). That is, teleological 
collectives do not have a central core of agency at which 
it is possible to reason its way to a genuinely group-level 
volition, or decision, or action. To see this, it is helpful to 
compare them with agential collectives. An agential collec-
tive can decide something (have a volition over it), even if 
no member decides that thing—indeed, even if no member 
would decide that thing. This happens in cases of intra-group 
compromise. Suppose the Coca-Cola board decides to say 
something about the GPGP. Half want to say it is regrettable, 
but not deplorable; the other half want to say it is deplorable. 
They all agree ‘awful’ is halfway between ‘regrettable’ and 
‘deplorable.’ So, as a compromise, the board decides ‘Coca-
Cola will say the GPGP is awful.’ This group-level volition 
has arisen out of the group’s decision-making procedure: 
no individual member has decided this. What’s more, if 
any given individual members were to decide for the board, 
using just her own decision-making procedures, then she 
would have decided differently (choosing either ‘regrettable’ 
or ‘deplorable,’ not ‘awful’) and would have used a different 
procedure to decide (using her own deliberative faculties, 
rather than a compromise procedure). (If she would have 
taken others’ preferences into account, then this is more like 
her operationalising the distinctively group-level procedure, 
than it is like her making her own decision.)
Such uniquely group-level procedures (e.g. compro-
mise) for producing uniquely group-level volitions (e.g. 
‘awful’) are possible in agential collectives, but these 
features cannot arise if members merely act responsively 
toward a common goal. To illustrate, suppose Algalita 
and NOAA each adopt the goal of cleaning up the GPGP, 
and each start to do so responsively (e.g. NOAA starts at 
the East because Algalita has already started at the West; 
Algalita then heads South when it notices NOAA heading 
North). There is not yet any mechanism in place for pro-
ducing an Algalita-NOAA distinctively group-level deci-
sion on who cleans which areas. This is because, unlike in 
an agential collective, any alleged group-level Algalita-
NOAA decision: (1) cannot conflict with the individual 
companies’ private decisions; (2) cannot be other than a 
stringing together (with ‘and’) of the two companies’ pri-
vate decisions (‘NOAA will clean the East and North and 
Algalita will clean the West and South’); (3) is compart-
mentalised: each company has influence only over their 
own ‘part’ of the decision. Contrast this with our imagined 
Coca-Cola board decision, where the group decision (1) 
conflicted with all members’ private decisions, (2) was not 
made of parts conjoined by ‘and,’ so (3) did not have parts 
that were divided amongst members.
One might think decision-making is not the only agential 
capacity: perhaps teleological collectives have some other 
agential capacities. But decision-making—and, more specif-
ically, the ability to make decisions via moral reasoning—is 
necessary to bear prospective responsibility, which is ulti-
mately at issue here. And the above three points apply just 
as much to beliefs, desires, and intentions as to decisions. 
Thus, teleological collectives lack many agential capacities 
that are crucial to prospective responsibility.
Of course, teleological collectives are not entirely like 
diffuse ones, for at least three reasons. First, many teleologi-
cal collectives are such that they would be transformed into 
agential collectives if all the members aimed at this. Isaacs 
(2011) uses ‘putative collective’ to mark collectives with 
this potentiality. Until this has happened, though, there is no 
distinct source of distinct decisions, at which we can target 
duty attributions.
Second, when a member of a teleological collective ful-
fils a prospective responsibility to bring about some good, 
they will often have to act responsively to other members 
of the teleological collective, as Algalita and NOAA do in 
the imagined example. This inter-relatedness of the con-
tent of members’ duties might be thought to suggest that 
the duties are held by the collective as such (Young 2011, 
pp. 180–181). However, we should not infer this. After all, 
all prospective responsibilities of all agents require their 
bearers to react to other agents. This might be a more press-
ing consideration within a teleological collective than within 
a diffuse one, but this is a matter of degree, not of kind. What 
matters for the existence of a group-level duty is not inter-
related content of individuals’ duties, but the possibility of 
group-level reasoning when deciding whether to produce 
a volition to act on the duty at all. Teleological collectives 
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are, then, like diffuse collectives in that they can have causal 
responsibility but not prospective responsibility.
Third, teleological group members are disposed to rely 
upon and reinforce one another’s endorsement of, and 
actions towards, the shared goal. It is also rational (at least, 
more rational than in diffuse collectives) for members of 
teleological groups to engage in ‘we-reasoning’ around their 
common goal. When someone we-reasons, he ‘considers 
which combination of actions by members of the team would 
best promote the team’s objective, and then performs his part 
of that combination.’ (Sugden 2003, p. 167, emphasis origi-
nal). We can thus view teleological groups thus hold a weak 
type of shared agency, though this doesn’t rise to the capac-
ity for collective-level reasoning. In the imagined example, 
Algalita’s cleaning action encourages NOAA’s specific 
cleaning action, which encourages Algalita’s subsequent 
action, and so on. Each chooses their individual action with 
the common goal in mind (‘cleaning the GPGP’) and does 
their bit of the collective pattern that will produce that result.
In light of this, what should we say about moral responsi-
bility in teleological collectives? Neither option is costless. 
First, we could decide that the weak type of shared agency 
is enough for blame. (Using different conceptions of weak 
shared agency, Sheehy (2007) and Pasternak (2011) each 
argues along these lines.) However, if we say this, then we 
must take one of two further options: (1) Impute prospective 
responsibility to teleological collectives. This is something I 
have argued firmly against (though this is the option Sheehy 
and Pasternak each endorse). (2) Deny an attractive general 
claim about the connection between moral and prospective 
responsibility. This attractive general claim concerns sym-
metry: ‘If there is symmetry, then whenever there is [moral] 
responsibility for an action after the fact, there will also have 
been an obligation to not have performed that action before 
the fact.’ (Lawford-Smith 2015, p. 241). In other words: 
to impute blameworthiness to teleological groups, while 
endorsing my argument that they lack obligations, requires 
saying that they can be blameworthy for some outcome with-
out having had an obligation not to produce that outcome.
So much for the first option: imputing blame to teleologi-
cal collectives. The second option is to point out that the 
common goals, mutual reliance, mutual reinforcement, and 
common rational availability of we-reasoning do not make 
for genuinely group-level volitions. The group cannot have 
a volition that differs from, and is produced in a way differ-
ent from, the sum of members’ decisions. This is important, 
because a wrongful volition seems necessary for blame to be 
justified. What’s more, the symmetry claim is highly attrac-
tive and (I have argued) teleological collectives lack obliga-
tions. Thus, we might deny group-level blame for teleologi-
cal collectives. This will seem unsatisfactory when some 
teleological group (such ‘the plastics lobby’) seems to be 
particularly connected to a harm. But notice all that we can 
say in such cases: we can say that each member of the plas-
tics lobby is blameworthy for having the goal of promoting 
plastics production and consumption, and for encouraging 
others to have that goal. To explain exactly why this is wrong 
for each agent, we can appeal to the wrongness of being part 
of the group that is causally responsible for a bad outcome. 
This doesn’t mean that we must blame each lobbyist for the 
entire GPGP [as Kutz (2000, p. 122) would be inclined to 
do]. Instead, each agent (whether individual or collective) 
has performed the wrongful action of making itself part of 
a harm-producing group.
In my view, denying teleological collectives’ blame is 
the best option. At least, this is true on the assumption that 
irreducible group-level volition is necessary for group-level 
blame to be justifiable. It will also be the best option if (1) 
we should retain symmetry between moral and prospective 
responsibility and (2) I am right that teleological collectives 
lack obligations.8
Agential Collectives
So far, I have discussed attributing responsibility to diffuse 
and teleological collectives. These are the trickiest cases for 
collective responsibility attributions. When we turn to agen-
tial collectives, we can see that they can straightforwardly 
be attributed all three kinds of responsibility. Indeed, this 
might seem to follow from arguments for the irreducible 
moral agency of agential collectives (e.g. given by Copp 
2007; Pettit 2007; Rovane 1998; Tollefsen 2015). But it is 
worth spelling out exactly why. This will allow us to see 
that there are still some gaps, particularly when it comes to 
prospective responsibility.
If we apply List and Menzies’ argument to diffuse and 
teleological collectives, then we can also apply it to agen-
tial collectives. However, this means that assigning causal 
responsibility to an agential collective is defensible only 
when the collective-level phenomenon is what makes a dif-
ference to the presence or absence of some effect. For exam-
ple, imagine that BP’s role in the Deep Horizon spill was in 
fact dependent on the actions of just one employee, acting 
beyond the scope of their role. In that case, the collective-
level is not the difference-making level. By contrast, if BP’s 
oversight procedures (for example) more-or-less ensured that 
some disaster like this would happen at some point, then the 
collective-level is the relevant causal level. The same is true 
for diffuse and teleological collectives. But this limitation 
8 While I have argued that teleological collectives lack prospective 
responsibilities, there is perhaps room for debate over whether (1) an 
irreducibly group-level volition is necessary for group-level blame to 
be justifiable and (2) we should retain symmetry between moral and 
prospective responsibility. Unfortunately, I lack space to pursue these 
arguments here. I thank * for extensive comments on these issues.
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is particularly worth noting for agential collectives, since 
we might too readily attribute causal power to the agential 
collective as such.
For moral responsibility, there are other necessary con-
ditions to add. As alluded to above, moral responsibility 
requires a certain quality of will—a volition, intending, 
willing, or trying—alongside harm-causing actions. Also 
alluded to above, agential collectives can have qualities of 
will even if some, most, or even all members lack that qual-
ity.. I mentioned compromises earlier, but discursive dilem-
mas are the most well-known cases of this kind. Imagine a 
three-person group that makes decisions via majoritarian 
voting. It votes on the motions P, Q, and R in turn. Motion P 
is that humans are not sentient, Q is that humans are nutri-
tious, and R is that humans are a sustainable food source. 
Assume these are each necessary and together sufficient for 
it to be permissible to kill and eat humans. A votes for P, for 
Q, and again R; B votes for P, against Q, and for R; and C 
votes against P, for Q, and against R. So, by voting on each 
of P, Q, and R in turn, the group comes to believe in all three 
motions.9 The group, thereby, comes to believe that it is per-
missible to kill and eat humans. Being rational, it forms the 
volitions entailed by this (such as being unfazed if it starts to 
do so, and intending not to interfere if others do so). In this 
kind of case, no individual member is morally responsible 
for the agential collective’s coming to this belief—after all, 
they each individually deny that that all three motions are 
true—so we must place blameworthiness the group itself 
(Pettit 2007, pp. 197–198).
However, if we are to blame the collective itself, the col-
lective itself must be a moral agent. This requires that the 
agential collective can respond appropriately to moral rea-
sons. If a group’s members are human moral agents, and 
can recognise moral reasons, then it is natural to assume 
they can design a group decision-making procedure so that 
moral reasons are treated as desires, in the sense of hav-
ing a ‘world-to-mind’ direction of fit. And it is natural to 
assume they can design the procedure so that the group, by 
and large, responds to moral reasons, such that the group 
takes its own measures in response to these reasons (Pettit 
2007, p. 187). Of course, it’s unlikely that the group will do 
this infallibly, but if infallibility were the standard for moral 
agency, then no human would be a moral agent. So, this is 
not a conceptual roadblock to agential collectives’ moral 
responsibility. It is, however, a practical roadblock: if some 
agential collective is constitutionally incapable of recognis-
ing moral reasons (if its procedure is set up so that members 
cannot present these reasons to the agential collective) then 
the agential collective cannot be held morally responsible.
If an agential collective is a moral agent—if it can use 
its decision-making procedure to respond appropriately to 
moral reasons—then it can have prospective responsibil-
ity. This might look like great news for attributing duties 
regarding such issues as cleaning up the GPGP. However, 
before we can assign prospective responsibilities to agential 
collectives, we must ask about ability gaps and justification 
gaps. Agential collectives seem powerful when compared 
with individual agents, so it is tempting to think that they 
can do anything and everything. Patently, this is not the case. 
Ability gaps abound for agential collectives. In short, this 
is because agential collectives’ actions must be enacted by 
their individual members. Many agential collectives (e.g. 
states and business corporations) have a fair amount of con-
trol over their members, but this control only goes so far.
Inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) are a clear 
example here. Very roughly, an IGO is a collective, cre-
ated by agreement between states, of which the members 
are states or organs of states. State members are bound by 
the decision-making procedures of IGOs, so are obliged 
to follow the role instructions that they are given by the 
IGO’s decision-making procedure (unless the state has 
entered a “reservation” on that point, upon acceding to the 
treaty establishing the IGO). This includes abiding by the 
conventions that the IGO endorses on behalf of its mem-
bers. However, given that IGOs are run by their members 
(states), IGOs can only distribute to states those roles that 
states have given the IGO decision-making procedure the 
power to distribute—and IGOs can only distribute those 
roles in the way that states permit through the formulation 
of the decision-making procedure. Yes, IGOs can and some-
times do provide ‘warrants,’ ‘approval,’ and ‘legitimacy’ to 
states’ actions [as Harbour (2004, p. 67) argues in defence 
of their status as moral agents]. But they are not the ones 
executing the actions and their instructions are not always 
taken as authoritative. As James Crawford notes, “[u]nlike 
states, international organizations do not possess general 
competence: they may only exercise those powers expressly 
or impliedly bestowed upon them” (2012, p. 184, empha-
sis added). IGOs are a particularly clear case. But to some 
extent or other, this is a problem for all agential collectives. 
They are at the mercy of their members or some subset of 
their members. They can be disbanded or have their proce-
dures overridden if enough members (or the right ones) act 
to make it so. (Of course, members might have obligations 
to do what they can to ensure their collectives can, and do, 
discharge their obligations. I argue for these member obliga-
tions in Collins 2017a).
Even if an agential collective is able to perform some 
action, we might face a justification gap in giving an account 
of why it is obliged to perform that action. In business ethics, 
9 The discursive dilemma is a generalisation of the doctrinal paradox 
(Kornhauser and Sager 1993). It is discussed by Pettit and by List in 
many places, but especially List and Pettit (2011, Chap 2).
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this has long been framed in terms of the debate between 
shareholder and stakeholder theory. In the terms of this 
article, that is a debate about when, and why, there are jus-
tification gaps in businesses’ responsibilities. According to 
shareholder theorists, there are justification gaps whenever 
an action is not in the interests of shareholders (though see 
Mansell 2013). According to stakeholder theorists, justi-
fication gaps are far less widespread, since a prospective 
responsibility to perform some action can be justified if it is 
in the interests of a wider set of stakeholders. I do not wish 
to settle this dispute here. My purpose in mentioning it is to 
point out that this debate occupies a tiny portion of what we 
might think about under the rubric of agential collectives’ 
responsibility, and to show that we can frame this dispute 
in terms of a dispute about the prevalence of responsibility 
gaps—more specifically, prospective responsibility gaps, 
and even more specifically, justification gaps.
Last but not least, consider fulfilment gaps. Almost no 
matter what one’s view of justification gaps (specifically, 
whether one is a shareholder or a stakeholder theorist), one 
will look out into the world and see fulfilment gaps: cases 
where an agential collective was able to bring about some 
good, and had a duty to do it, but failed to fulfil that duty. 
In such cases, we can place censure upon the agential col-
lective itself. The question will remain of whether other 
agents (collective or individual) have duties to ‘pick up the 
slack.’ This is another debate that I cannot settle here, but 
rather, again, wish to place within my framework: the debate 
about whether agential collectives have duties to pick up 
the slack for one another’s failures is a debate in fulfilment 
gaps, which will, in turn, depend upon one’s position on 
justification gaps.
The conclusions of this section are summarised in 
Table 3.
Conclusion
What kinds of collective responsibility gaps are there? 
Many, but not all of them should worry us.
Causal responsibility gaps are the least worrying, because 
causal responsibility can be attributed to all kinds of collec-
tives. Gaps in causal responsibility arise only if we cannot 
identify any level of description—individual or collective—
that made a difference to the presence of some effect.
Moral responsibility gaps—most pressingly, gaps in 
blameworthiness—arise when an effect arises from a diffuse 
collective, such as plastics users, or from a teleological col-
lective, such as the plastics lobby. (Strictly speaking, moral 
responsibility gaps won’t arise for teleological collectives if 
(1) a rebuttal of moral/prospective symmetry is possible and 
(2) an irreducibly group-level volition is not necessary for 
collective blame.) One option for filling these gaps would 
be to reconceptualise diffuse and teleological collectives as 
agential collectives, and then attribute moral responsibility 
to them. However, this runs the risk of mischaracterising 
diffuse and teleological collectives, and misattributing blame 
to their members. A better option, it seems, is to reserve our 
negative reactive attitudes for agential collectives—and for 
individuals in non-agential collectives.
Likewise, prospective responsibility contains numer-
ous gaps, insofar duties cannot be attributed to diffuse or 
teleological collectives, and insofar agential collectives 
do not always have the abilities or justifications necessary 
for duties. I have suggested possible ways of filling these 
prospective responsibility gaps elsewhere (Collins 2017b). 
Lastly, for prospective responsibility, there will always be 
fulfilment gaps: agential collectives will never live up to the 
moral demands we make of them, even on fairly ‘narrow’ 
demands, such as those of shareholder theory.
The diagnosis, then, is mixed. We cannot make as many 
collective responsibility attributions as we might have 
hoped, but we can make more than we might have thought.
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Table 3  Types of collective responsibility gaps
Responsibility
Causal responsibility Moral responsibility Prospective responsibility
Collective Diffuse collective Defensible, if there is collective-
level difference-making
Not defensible Not defensible
Teleological collective Defensible, if there is collective-
level difference-making
Probably not defensible Not defensible
Agential collective Defensible, if there is collective-
level difference-making
Defensible, if the collective had 
the relevant quality of will and 
produced the outcome
Defensible, if the collective has the 
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